The Political economy of oil and gas in Central Asia

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The 21st Century is still an age of oil

Oil as the primary source of energy for socio-economic development is still irreplaceable by other sources because of – high energy intensity & efficiency, easy exploration & convenience in transport.

**Cost efficiency**


Geographical distribution of current production of world oil & gas – a major factor affecting nation’s development

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Geographical distribution of reserves concentrated in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia & Qatar) but recent findings would put Iran & Caspian Sea as major areas of gas reserves.

2012 Global trade movements of oil & gas
Oil mostly spreads from the Middle East to China and East Asia, whilst gas flow from the Middle East, Russia & Central Asia to China and Europe.

Source: US EIA
European dependence on Russian Gas – impact on gas pipeline competition & regional politics & economics

The gas factor for Europe

Production of gas in the North Sea dwindles that there is a heavy European dependence on Russian gas, especially for Baltic & East European countries and Germany.

Source: http://stavrev.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/image-59202-galleryV9-rdxc.jpg
1. In the 1990s Caspian Sea was said to be the next Alaska or North Sea for the oil and gas industry. The reserves of the Caspian basin were estimated to be at least the second richest in the world. The most conservative estimations of the Caspian basin’s energy wealth set it at 200 billion barrels of oil and natural gas. An amount exceeded only by the reserves of Saudi Arabia.

2. In 2003, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated the Caspian basin area to hold 48 billion barrels (bn bls) of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. By comparison, the Middle East’s proven reserves alone amount to more than 803 bn bls of oil and about 2,827 tcf for gas (including Iran, which holds about 158 bn bls of oil and 1,201 tcf of gas). (‘Instead of the 16 per cent of world reserves the US State Department implies, it is likely to be closer to 3 per cent’)

3. Yet, the geology of the region has not been fully explored. The Kashagan oil field, discovered in 2000 in Kazakhstan, was then hailed as the largest oil discovery in 50 years; it is currently the largest offshore oil field outside the Middle East. The Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan is the largest gas field in the Caspian Sea and among the 20 biggest in the world. There are new discoveries in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even Tajikistan with Turkmenistan as a major gas producer.
1. After 1991, the U.S. had hopes that the Caspian Sea could become an alternative to the Middle East as a source of oil, especially because its states, apart from Iran, do not belong to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The EU also hoped that supplies from the region would reduce its dependence on Russian gas. There has been a strong incentive to construct the east-west energy corridor with pipelines from the Caspian Sea to create a secure oil supply in Eurasia as it steers away from a dependency on Middle East oil.

2. With the resurgence of Russia under Putin after 2000, US & EU would like to reduce the influence of Russia in the Central Asia and South Caucasus and favours the construction of non-Russian pipelines to divert oil & gas resources away from Russia. Hence there have been an intensive struggle with Russia over location & routing of the Eurasian pipeline system with the southern stream being the focus of the competition.
Political economy of oil & gas pipelines – location of production & transport plus price competition

Pipelines:
1. via China the Turkmenistan-China pipeline in yellow;
2. via Russia South Stream in orange;
3. via Iran the Turkmenistan Transcontinental Pipeline (TTP) in green;
4. via the Caspian Sea and the Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP) in red;
5. the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) in purple;
6. Nabucco-West in magenta;
7. the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in blue; &
8. those existing in 2012 in gray solid lines.


Russia versus Central Asia plus Iran
To reduce European dependence on Russian gas, there has been competition between EU and Russia for pipelines in the southern routes allowing Central Asia (Azerbaijan & Turkmenistan) plus Iran to supply Europe versus strengthening Russia’s control over gas supplies to Europe.

Sources:
Due to Geopolitical Considerations and Economic attractiveness the EU has been giving Political support to the Southern Gas Corridor Projects

Business supportive environment, liberalized market and moderate tax regime are appealing factors to develop Southern Gas Corridor projects considering Transit of Caspian Gas through GEORGIAN territory

Gas originated from the Shah Deniz Gasfield of Azerbaijan, but passes through Georgia. But Russia & Iran might join

The Southern Gas Corridor

The first gas supplies through the corridor to Georgia and Turkey are given a target date of late 2018. Gas deliveries to Europe are expected just over a year after, but it was abandoned subsequently

Italy & Azerbaijan signed in March 2016 a MoU regarding deliveries of Russian natural gas to Italy. In February 2016 Gazprom & other companies agreed deliveries of Russian gas via an undersea pipeline in the Black Sea & through third countries to Greece and from Greece to Italy.

Source: Anakhanum Hidayatova, Azerbaijan’s Southern Gas Corridor – the only real project, Italy says, Trend: 4 March 2016.

The Southern Gas Corridor, which envisages transportation of the Azerbaijani gas to Europe, is the only real project in this sphere, said Italy’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Giampaolo Cutillo.

The Nabucco Pipeline was proposed in 2002, and replaced by Nabucco West in 2005 with inter-government agreement signed in 2009. It is intended to rival Russia’s South Stream project. It is revived in 2015, mostly by Bulgaria, when Russia abandoned the South Stream project under pressure. BTC is an integral part of it but has completed already.
Russia’s proposal for a Turkish Stream with support from Hungary and Turkey

2015 plan – a $40 billion route passing through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia and Serbia, then into Hungary and perhaps on to Austria.

Russia intends to use it to replace the South Stream that was abandoned in 2014 & to achieve a halt to gas supply to Europe via Ukraine by 2018. It faces opposition from the US & EU.

TurkStream plan is cut by half to 32 bcm p.a. in October 2015 after the Nord II & suspended in November.
Lately attempts in 2015 to address the energy security of Europe – to avoid the disruption caused by possible stoppage of Russia gas supply through Ukraine – Nord Stream II

Agreement signed in September between Russian & German firms to build a second Nord Stream parallel to the original Nord Stream (operational in 2011) to double the supply of 55 billion M3 per year. It is intended to rebalance the expected reduced production from the North Sea, to be operational by end 2019.

Oil and gas resources in Russia and Central Asia

Source: Caspian Basin Alert: Oil & Gas Economics, by Sarah Smith and Nathan Somers, http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/caspianecon.html

2003 production and reserve estimates

Selected Oil and Gas Pipeline Infrastructure in the Former Soviet Union

Oil Production, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region or Basin</th>
<th>Thousand Barrels/Day</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>5,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga-Urals</td>
<td>1,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precaspian</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Caucasus</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timan-Pechora</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Caspian</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Turgay</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan onshore</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sea</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Region</td>
<td>10,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World</td>
<td>75,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gas Production, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region or Basin</th>
<th>Billion Cubic Meters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>773.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>400.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Precaspian</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volga-Urals</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<td>South Caucasus</td>
<td>15.7</td>
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<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timan-Pechora</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan onshore</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Sea</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Region</td>
<td>744.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World</td>
<td>2,618.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Former_USR_Oil_and_Gas_map.svg
One-quarter of all energy for Europe comes from Russia, which is after the US the largest producer of natural gas in the world.

The real long-term threat to Russian influence in Europe comes less from Azerbaijan than from the building of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. These are facilities located on coastlines that convert LNG back to natural gas after it has been liquefied to enable transport across seas and oceans. With an LNG terminal, a country is less dependent on pipelines emanating from Russia.

Source: Russia’s Pipelines of Empire, Robert Kaplan, Stratfor, November 14, 2013
It carries oil from the Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field and condensate from Shah Deniz across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. It links Sangachal terminal on the shores of the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. In addition, crude oil from Turkmenistan continues to be transported via the pipeline. It also transports Tengiz crude oil from Kazakhstan.

The pipeline that became operational in June 2006 was operated by BP, represents the first non-Russian pipeline to Europe from Central Asia.
China uses Central Asia as its main vehicle of diversifying its energy imports

Oil mainly from Kazakhstan and gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

China’s domestic deposits of oil and gas are limited. Proven oil reserves are estimated to be 17.4 billion barrels, or 1.0% of world reserves, and gas reserves are 3.1 trillion cubic metres, or 1.7% of the world.


The annual volume of natural gas supplied by Turkmenistan to China will increase from 40 bcm in 2014 to 65 bcm in 2020 (after gas from the Galkynysh field will start flowing), the fourth branch (D) of the pipeline through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is being built for that purpose.

Source: Qaya Mammadov, Turkmenistan positions itself as Eurasian natural gas power, Oil and Gas Journal, 12 July 2015
• China has invested US$ 7.1 billion in 2009 & 2011 in Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field, among the largest in the world, and has a production share contract for Bagtyyarlyk contract territory and in Amu River. Turkmenistan supplies nearly 40 percent of China’s total gas imports via a central Asia-China trunkline and shipments by tankers of super-chilled liquefied natural gas (LNG).

• In 1997 China first promised to invest U.S. $9.5 billion (65.5 billion yuan) in Kazakhstan. It controls approximately 20 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil production and has constructed one of the world’s longest oil pipelines, running 2,300 km from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang province. CNPC owns a significant stake in the Kashagan oil field in the Caspian Sea, while Chinese companies own several key oil fields around the western city of Aktobe.

• China has concluded with Uzbekistan a $15 billion bilateral energy deal in 2013.

• China has also financed two refineries in Kyrgyzstan, in the towns of Kara-Balta and Tomok.

• In 2013, CNPC acquired a one-third interest in Tajikistan's Bokhtar oil and gas field, which was said to 3.2 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves.
Note: All figures are based on 2011 data. Transit numbers will not total 100% as many shipments transship multiple shipping routes/chokepoints. Percentages reflect portion of overall imports by product group. Pipeline capacities represent designed capacity, not current flow rates.

Source: https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/01/China%20import%20transit%20routes.jpg
1. Russia and China have signed a 30-year, $400bn (£237bn) deal for Gazprom to deliver Russian gas to China in a deal to provide 38bn cubic metres of gas each year.

2. Russia delivers most of its production of gas (8 bcm in 2017 to 16 bcm in 2020) in Uzbekistan to China under China-Uzbekistan agreement.

Drop of Central Asia exports of gas to China in early 2018

Turkmenistan promised to increase gas exports to China to 38 bcm 2017, 9% jump.