Chaos in Azad Kashmir and Regional Instability

The Azad Kashmir Issue and the Awami Action Committee: A Detailed Overview

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), often called Azad Kashmir or Pakistan-administered Kashmir, is a region administered by Pakistan but constitutionally distinct from it. It has its own legislative assembly and government, yet remains deeply tied to Pakistan’s stance on the broader Kashmir dispute with India. The region has long grappled with economic challenges, governance issues, and political representation debates rooted in its unique status.

Map Credit: iStock-PeterHermesFurian

The region is encircled in red.

What is the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC)?

The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JK-JAAC or JAAC), also referred to as the Awami Action Committee (AAC), is a grassroots civil-society coalition founded on September 17, 2023, in Muzaffarabad. It began as an alliance of traders, transporters, lawyers, students, and other civic groups protesting rising electricity tariffs, inflation, subsidised flour prices, and governance failures.

Key leaders and spokespersons include Shaukat Nawaz Mir, Sardar Umar Nazir Khawaja (or Umar Nazir Kashmiri), Khawaja Mehran Arshad, Sardar Aman Khan, and others. The group operates through a 31-member core committee and promotes a 38-point Charter of Demands covering economic relief (e.g., lower power and wheat prices based on local hydro resources like Mangla Dam), governance reforms, infrastructure, and structural changes.

Initially focused on public welfare and economic justice, the movement gained traction through strikes, sit-ins, and long marches. It achieved some successes, such as government subsidies and packages in 2024 and an October 4, 2025 agreement addressing many demands. However, dissatisfaction over implementation grew, leading to escalated protests.

What are the reasons for chaos in Kashmir? Core Grievances and the Contested 12 Refugee Seats

The most contentious demand is the abolition of 12 seats reserved in the 45-seat AJK Legislative Assembly for refugees from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir who settled in mainland Pakistan after 1947. Protesters argue these seats enable “political engineering” by Pakistan’s mainstream parties (e.g., influence from Punjab or other provinces), diluting local representation and resources.

The government views these seats as symbolic of Pakistan’s commitment to the Kashmir cause and the unresolved dispute, arguing their removal could undermine constitutional arrangements and claims on the region. Other demands include better electricity/gas pricing, overseas voting rights, administrative reforms, and ending elite privileges.

Critics of JAAC allege the group has shifted from legitimate economic protests to anti-state activities, questioning AJK’s ties to Pakistan and allegedly receiving external support, including from India. JAAC denies this, insisting on peaceful advocacy for rights and loyalty to Pakistan while criticising specific policies.

Escalation, Ban, and 2026 Protests

Tensions peaked in 2025 with large strikes and a major agreement. In 2026, ahead of July 27 legislative elections, JAAC called for protests and a wheel-jam strike on June 9, focusing on the refugee seats.

On June 5, 2026, the AJK government banned JAAC (and aliases) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, citing terrorism, anarchy, intimidation, and threats to peace. It placed the group on the First Schedule, leading to arrests, bounties, property seals, and Fourth Schedule listings for activists. Internet suspensions, curfews, and security deployments followed.

Protests continued with sit-ins (e.g., in Rawalakot), strikes, and marches despite the ban. JAAC accused authorities of excessive force, killings, and repression; the government accused protesters of attacking security forces, hospitals, and blocking essentials.

What is the latest situation?

Violence has been significant since early June 2026, with both sides reporting casualties and offering contrasting narratives (protesters: excessive force on peaceful demonstrators; authorities: self-defence against armed attacks on personnel and infrastructure).

Early June clashes (e.g., Rawalakot, June 7–8): Multiple deaths, including civilians and security personnel. Reports varied widely—official figures around 7–15 killed in initial days, with dozens injured. Incidents involved alleged attacks on police, a military hospital, and road blockades.

Ongoing unrest through June–July: Strikes, sit-ins (e.g., 36+ days in Poonch/Rawalakot), road blockades, and supply disruptions. Death toll estimates by mid-June ranged from 20–30+ (conservative official/local figures), with some higher unverified claims. Hundreds arrested or injured; cases registered.

July 14, 2026 clashes (most recent major incident): Multiple sources reported that nine were killed in Poonch sector/Rawalakot area. In Tararkhal: 6 protesters and 1 police officer. In Rawalakot: 1 protester and 1 security official. This occurred amid efforts to clear blockades ahead of a planned march. Overall unrest since June: around 30 deaths by conservative estimates.

Earlier, JAAC announced a deadline of July 14 for demands, threatening a long march to Muzaffarabad on July 15 and new announcements if unmet. The government insists elections proceed on schedule (July 27) and rejects blanket amnesty, holding JAAC responsible for violence and disruptions.

What are the broader implications for China?

The JAAC movement highlights deep frustrations in AJK over economic neglect, representation, and governance, amplified by its strategic location in the Kashmir dispute.

The situation remains fluid, with risks of further escalation around elections and the planned march. Dialogue has been attempted but stalled amid mutual accusations. Economic losses (e.g., tourism, trade) are substantial, and humanitarian concerns (supply shortages, internet blackouts) persist.

The AJK situation is not an existential threat to China-Pakistan relations, which remain robust due to shared strategic goals against India and economic interdependence. However, it adds to a pattern of security headaches for CPEC (alongside Baloch militancy and other insurgencies as mentioned in other assessment reports), testing Beijing’s patience and highlighting governance vulnerabilities in Pakistan. China’s likely approach: Prioritise behind-the-scenes support for stabilisation, enhanced security cooperation, and continued investment with stricter safeguards—while publicly staying neutral. If unrest persists or spreads toward core CPEC zones (e.g., Gilgit-Baltistan), implications could intensify, potentially slowing BRI momentum in South Asia and prompting diversification of routes elsewhere. As of mid-July 2026, with planned marches and elections looming, the situation warrants close monitoring by Chinese strategists. We assess that if the issues were not politically addressed, external forces, notably India, can exploit the situation. In that case, the situation will escalate further.

Unrest in AJK can spill over or inspire similar instability in adjacent areas like Gilgit-Baltistan, where CPEC projects (roads, power plants, special economic zones) are concentrated. Broader Pakistani instability—exacerbated by parallel insurgencies in Balochistan targeting CPEC—heightens risks to Chinese personnel, workers, and assets. Renewed violence could lead to further delays, cost overruns, or scaled-back investments.

This issue underscores longstanding tensions in Pakistan-administered Kashmir: balancing local aspirations with national strategic interests. Resolution likely requires addressing genuine grievances through transparent negotiations while maintaining constitutional stability.