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The Drone War: An Emerging Threat to Regional Security and Larger Chinese Interests

How did the drone war start in the Af-Pak region?

Since the so-called war on terror in Afghanistan and the region, drones have been introduced as a powerful weapon to eradicate terrorism. The first-ever drone attack by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was reported on 7th October 2001 in Kandahar province of Afghanistan and was claimed to target the Afghan Taliban leadership. On June 18, 2004, the United States carried out its first known drone strike in Pakistan’s former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (South Waziristan), killing Taliban leader Nek Muhammad Wazir. That was how the drone war entered Pakistan. Later on, for at least two decades, the U.S. Air Force MQ-9A Reapers were used excessively and extensively in the Af-Pak region.


Even though dozens of militant leaders were killed, hundreds of people were killed and termed collateral damage in the war. The Belt and Road Research Institute, Hong Kong Chu Hai College, in its research, has found many instances where women and children were killed in those strikes, and it proved counterproductive, giving rise to many militant fighters in response.


How did militants start using drones?

With the US-led NATO troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, commercial drones for filming were already available in the electronics market. The first reported drone attacks by militants associated with or closely allied to the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) in Pakistan occurred in 2024, specifically a cluster of about six incidents between July and September 2024 in North Waziristan district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

These early attacks primarily involved the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG) or factions within the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) alliance (which includes HGBG, Lashkar-e-Islam, and related elements that coordinate with or operate in the broader TTP ecosystem).


They used commercially available Chinese DJI quadcopters (such as Mavic 3, Matrice series, or Air 2 models) modified to drop rudimentary improvised explosive devices—often plastic bottles filled with 400–700 grams of explosives, sometimes detonated with grenades—targeting security forces’ convoys, checkpoints, and installations on the ground.

  • These were among the earliest documented cases of militants weaponising off-the-shelf drones for kinetic attacks inside Pakistan (as opposed to pure surveillance or propaganda filming).

  • TTP itself was conducting similar (often unclaimed) drone strikes around the same period or shortly afterwards but initially avoided formal claims, reportedly to limit additional counterterrorism pressure. Competition with IMP later pushed TTP to publicly claim attacks and formalise a dedicated “Air Force” drone unit (led by Maulvi Saleem Haqqani) in December 2025.

  • By 2025, the tactic expanded significantly: Pakistani forces faced roughly 405 drone attacks by TTP and affiliates (most repelled), with further growth into 2026 (hundreds more reported or foiled in KP alone).


Why do terrorists prefer drone attacks?

Terrorists and militant groups (such as the TTP and its affiliates) view commercial drone attacks as superior to many conventional methods—ambushes, roadside IEDs, vehicle-borne suicide bombings, or direct assaults—primarily because drones deliver asymmetric advantages that reduce risk, lower costs, and exploit gaps in state defences.

Key reasons from operational analyses:

  1. Dramatically lower risk to operators


    Conventional attacks often require fighters to approach targets closely or act as suicide bombers, leading to high casualties or captures. Drones allow remote operation from a safe distance (sometimes kilometres away). Operators can stay hidden, reuse skills, and avoid confrontation. This is repeatedly highlighted as a core benefit for groups like the TTP: they minimise losses while still inflicting damage on security forces.

  2. Cost-effectiveness and accessibility


    Commercial quadcopters (e.g., Chinese DJI models) cost roughly $200–$1,000 and are widely available or easy to smuggle. They can be quickly modified to drop small IEDs, grenades, or mortar rounds. In contrast, preparing and executing high-impact conventional attacks (especially vehicle-borne suicide operations) is more expensive, logistically complex, and resource-intensive. Drones turn cheap consumer technology into a force multiplier against a better-equipped state military.

  3. Ability to bypass ground defences


    Security forces traditionally rely on checkpoints, road control, fortified posts, and terrain dominance. Drones fly over these obstacles and attack from above or unexpected angles that ground-based defences were not designed to counter. This lets militants strike convoys, police stations, or outposts without navigating the same risks as an ambush or infiltration.

  4. Enhanced surveillance, precision, and tactical flexibility


    Drones provide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Militants can track troop movements, map patrol routes, identify weak points, and time strikes accurately. They can also be combined with traditional tactics (e.g., a drone drop during a ground engagement). This improves targeting compared to less precise methods while allowing night operations with thermal-equipped models in some cases.

  5. Psychological and propaganda impact


    The constant threat of attacks from the sky forces security personnel into 360-degree vigilance (“one eye on the gun, one on the sky”), raising stress, slowing operations, and reducing morale. Successful strikes generate high-quality video footage that groups use for propaganda—portraying technological sophistication, claiming victories, and undermining confidence in the state—while sometimes distancing themselves from civilian casualties.

  6. Scalability and adaptation


    Once groups master the technology (often learning from the Afghan Taliban or through cross-border knowledge transfer), they can launch frequent low-cost attacks. Formalising units (e.g., TTP’s “Air Force”) institutionalises the capability. Drones also help groups compete with rivals by demonstrating innovation.

Drones are not always superior. Early analyses noted that in open rural terrain, conventional IEDs and suicide attacks can still be cheaper and more lethal in some scenarios. Payloads are usually small, range and endurance are limited compared to military systems, and states are developing countermeasures (jammers, nets, detection systems). Effectiveness depends on the specific environment, group resources, and how well the technology is integrated with existing tactics.


But for non-state actors facing a stronger conventional force, drones offer a relatively cheap, low-risk way to project power, create persistent pressure, and achieve tactical effects that were previously harder or costlier to obtain. This is why groups like the TTP and related factions in Pakistan rapidly adopted and expanded their use after initial experiments around 2024.


How did the Baloch separatists start using drones?

With the use of drones by militant organisations like the TTP, the Baloch separatist organisations like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have also suddenly increased the use of drones for attacks in 2026. Baloch militant groups, including the BLA, initially used commercial off-the-shelf drones (primarily Chinese DJI-type quadcopters) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—scouting targets, monitoring security forces, and supporting ground operations—before full weaponisation. These systems were acquired through local markets, black-market channels linked to Afghanistan, and smuggling routes along the Iran-Pakistan border.


The BLA formalised its capability by announcing a dedicated aerial and drone warfare unit called QAHR (Qazi Aero Hive Rangers) in February 2026. The unit was named after senior commander Abdul Basit (alias Qazi), who is credited with conceptualising it. BLA presented QAHR as its first “air unit,” aimed at aligning guerrilla warfare with modern technology for reconnaissance, coordination, propaganda footage, and limited kinetic strikes (dropping small improvised explosives).


The unit’s first claimed operational use occurred during Operation Herof-2 (launched 31 January 2026), a large coordinated offensive involving roughly 1,000–1,200 fighters and about 40 attacks across multiple districts. BLA specifically claimed systematic drone strikes on military and port installations in Gwadar as part of this operation.


This development parallels (but followed) the TTP’s adoption of drones and reflects the BLA’s creation of specialised wings (e.g., Majeed Brigade for suicide operations, ZIRAB for intelligence, STOS for special tactical operations, and Fateh Squad for high-profile attacks). Analysts note that while the BLA has demonstrated intent and some kinetic use, sustained advanced drone warfare capabilities were still evolving in 2026, with commercial systems remaining the primary tool rather than sophisticated military-grade platforms.


This shows how drones have become a war culture in the world of terrorism and separatism. It is not limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan but has expanded to other parts of the world.


How did militants start drone attacks in Africa?

Though Alqaeda affiliate groups like the TTP started using drone attacks in Pakistan, in Africa and other regions, drones were used for visual propaganda or surveillance since 2018. It is only after the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 that Africa’s militant groups began turning in earnest to the weaponisation of drones. The first confirmed uses appeared in 2023, when Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) both deployed quadcopters to drop grenades, munitions, and other improvised explosive devices. The delivery of munitions by DJI Matrice 30T drones, which can carry two explosives, is the preferred method of JNIM, among the most prolific drone users in Africa’s insurgent groups. A majority of Africa’s largest militant groups now use similar tactics. It has been observed that the use of drones and fatalities due to them have increased in the last two years.


How is this drone warfare a threat to Chinese citizens and Chinese interests in the region?

Terrorists have utilised drones to launch deadly cross-border attacks against Chinese citizens working on infrastructure and mining projects abroad. In November 2025, two separate cross-border attacks were launched from Afghan territory into Tajikistan. These attacks specifically targeted Chinese workers on gold mines and related infrastructure projects in Tajikistan. Many Chinese lost their lives in these attacks. While historical anti-China terrorist activity-particularly in Pakistan by groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)-has relied predominantly on suicide bombers, car bombs, and armed assaults, the integration of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) represents an emerging and highly sophisticated shift in militant tactics. Another aspect that was noted in these attacks by both separatists and terrorists is that they are constantly targeting security installations with drones that are vital for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and so the targets are located on the CPEC route. Here are the major locations where the separatists claimed most of the drone attacks: Gwadar, Kalat, Kharan, Surab Nushki, Mastung, and Qilla Abdullah.

The map on the left shows the concentration of drone attacks, while the map on the right shows Chinese projects

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan has the Western route for CPEC. In this region, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is using drones at major CPEC connectivity locations in Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Lakki Marwat.


The map on the left shows the concentration of drone attacks, while the map on the right shows the CPEC Western route projects

In Pakistan, due to excessive use of drones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, police and security forces have significantly expanded counter-drone capabilities in response to TTP’s growing use of commercial quadcopters. Fixed anti-drone systems capable of detecting, jamming control links, and spoofing navigation signals (with coverage of several kilometres) have been installed in key districts including Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, and Tank, while handheld anti-drone guns and jammers have been distributed to personnel in remote and border areas. These systems are now integrated into the Safe City Peshawar Command and Control Centre for real-time monitoring and response, complemented by a specialised UAV division—the first of its kind within a Pakistani police force—trained in both offensive drone operations and electronic warfare against hostile UAVs Additional low-tech measures include Ukraine-style reinforced overhead nets installed over police posts and compounds to protect against explosive drops.


In Balochistan, where BLA and other groups have also begun using drones, security forces (primarily the Frontier Corps and army units) rely on a combination of electronic jamming, kinetic interception, and heightened surveillance, though public details on dedicated police-level fixed anti-drone networks remain more limited compared to KP. Overall capacity in both provinces is still being scaled up under broader counterterrorism modernisation plans.


Why are FPV drones emerging as a challenge?

FPV (First Person View) drones are a significant challenge for security forces because they are fundamentally different from the slower commercial quadcopters (like modified DJI models) that militants in Pakistan currently use most often. Recently, the Baloch separatists successfully used FPV drones against security installations and moving security forces convoys in Balochistan.

Main reasons they are harder to counter:

Much higher speed and agility


FPV drones are built for racing and rapid manoeuvring. They can fly significantly faster and change direction more abruptly than standard camera drones. This makes them harder to detect early, track visually, or shoot down with small arms or basic anti-drone guns.

Real-time precision guidance


The operator wears goggles and flies the drone as if sitting inside it. This allows highly accurate terminal guidance — striking specific windows, vehicle weak points, trenches, or moving targets — rather than simply dropping an explosive from above and hoping for a hit.

Harder to jam effectively


Many standard anti-drone systems used in Pakistan are optimised against common commercial frequencies (especially DJI). FPV drones often use different radio frequencies, frequency-hopping systems, or (in more advanced versions) fibre-optic cables that are completely immune to radio jamming.

Low cost + high psychological pressure


They remain relatively cheap and expendable. Even when many are jammed or shot down, the constant threat forces troops at checkpoints and posts to remain on high alert, reducing operational tempo and morale.

Requires new tactics and equipment


Countering FPVs effectively needs better acoustic/radar detection, directed-energy or kinetic interceptors, specialised training, and physical protections (nets, cages) designed for fast, low-flying threats — capabilities that are still being scaled up in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan in Pakistan.


Our Strategic Assessment:

The Expanding Drone Threat in Asymmetric Warfare and Its Implications for Chinese Interests


The technological transformation of guerrilla warfare has elevated drones from a peripheral tool to a central instrument of militant strategy. In the Afghan-Pakistan theatre, and increasingly across Africa and the Middle East, terrorist and insurgent groups have demonstrated that commercially available and improvised drones offer a uniquely effective, low-cost, and relatively secure means of projecting force. Unlike conventional attacks that expose fighters to a high risk of detection and elimination, drone operations allow militants to strike from a distance, retain operational security, and achieve psychological and material impact disproportionate to their investment.


This shift is not merely tactical; it represents a structural change in the threat landscape. The proliferation of drone expertise, combined with cross-border knowledge transfer, is accelerating the diffusion of these capabilities. Groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have already operationalised armed drones against Chinese personnel and CPEC-related infrastructure. Parallel developments along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, where militants have employed drones in proximity to Chinese frontier regions, signal that the threat is no longer confined to traditional conflict zones inside Pakistan or Afghanistan.


Looking ahead, the strategic implications for Chinese interests are significant. CPEC projects, BRI connectivity corridors, and Chinese personnel operating in unstable environments face an elevated risk of precision aerial attacks that are difficult to predict, costly to defend against comprehensively, and politically sensitive when they result in Chinese casualties. The same model of low-cost, high-impact drone warfare that has proven effective in the Af-Pak region can be replicated against Chinese assets and personnel in other BRI partner states across Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.


In essence, the “drone culture” within the militant ecosystem is maturing rapidly. Unless countered through coordinated intelligence, technological countermeasures, and hardened project security architectures, this evolution threatens to impose persistent operational, economic, and reputational costs on China’s regional and global infrastructure footprint. The challenge is no longer hypothetical; it is already materialising along the western approaches to China’s borders and along the arteries of the Belt and Road.

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